Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition by Flyvbjerg, Bent et al.
Megaprojects and Risk
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thors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions
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1 The megaprojects paradox
A new animal
Wherever we go in the world, we are confronted with a new political
and physical animal: the multibillion-dollar mega infrastructure project.
In Europe we have the Channel tunnel, the Øresund bridge between
Denmark and Sweden, the Vasco da Gama bridge in Portugal, the
German MAGLEV train between Berlin and Hamburg, the creation
of an interconnected high-speed rail network for all of Europe, cross-
national motorway systems, the Alp tunnels, the fixed link across the
Baltic Sea between Germany and Denmark, plans for airports to become
gateways to Europe, enormous investments in new freight container har-
bours,  200 billion worth of transport infrastructure projects related
to German unification alone, links across the straits of Gibraltar and
Messina, the world’s longest road tunnel in Norway, not to speak of
new and extended telecommunications networks, systems of cross-border
pipelines for transport of oil and gas, and cross-national electrical power
networks to meet the growing demand in an emerging European energy
market. It seems as if every country, and pair of neighbouring countries,
is in the business of promoting this new animal, the megaproject, on the
European policy-making scene. And the European Union, with its grand
scheme for creating so-called ‘Trans-European Networks’, is an ardent
supporter and even initiator of such projects, just as it is the driving force
in creating the regulatory, and de-regulatory, regimes that are meant to
make the projects viable.1
The situation is similar in industrialised and industrialising coun-
tries in other parts of the world, from Asia to the Americas. There is,
for example, Hong Kong’s Chek Lap Kok airport, China’s Quinling
tunnel, the Akashi Kaikyo bridge in Japan, Sydney’s harbour tunnel,
Malaysia’s North–South Expressway, Thailand’s Second Stage Express-
way, and proposals for an integrated Eurasian transport network. In
the Americas there is Boston’s ‘Big Dig’, freeways and railways in
California, Denver’s new international airport, Canada’s Confederation
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bridge, the Sa˜o Paulo–Buenos Aires Superhighway, the Bi-Oceanic high-
way right across South America from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and
the Venezuela–Brazil highway. Even a proposed $50 billion project to
link the USA and Russia across the Bering Strait – the ‘biggest project
in history’, according to its promoters – is not missing in the megapro-
ject scheme of things.2 Outside the field of transport infrastructure there
is the Three Gorges dam in China, Russia’s natural gas pipelines, the
Pergau dam in Malaysia, flood control in Bangladesh, the Bolivia–Brazil
gas pipeline, the Venezuela–Brazil power line and, again and everywhere,
the ultimate megaproject, the Internet with associated infrastructure and
telecommunications projects.
Megaprojects form part of a remarkably coherent story, the ‘Great War of
Independence from Space’.
Zero-friction society
Megaprojects form part of a remarkably coherent story. Sociologist
Zygmunt Bauman perceptively calls it the ‘Great War of Independence
from Space’, and he sees the resulting new mobility as the most pow-
erful and most coveted stratifying factor in contemporary society.3 Paul
Virilio speaks of the ‘end of geography’ while others talk of the ‘death of
distance’.4 Bill Gates, founder and chair of Microsoft Corporation, has
dubbed the phenomenon ‘frictionless capitalism’ and sees it as a novel
stage in capitalist evolution.5 When Microsoft and Gates single out a
concept or a product, one is well advised to pay attention. ‘Frictionless
society’ may sound like an advertiser’s slogan in the context of its usage.
It is not. The term signifies a qualitatively different stage of social and
economic development.
In this development ‘infrastructure’ has become a catchword on a par
with ‘technology’. Infrastructure has rapidly moved from being a simple
precondition for production and consumption to being at the very core
of these activities, with just-in-time delivery and instant Internet access
being two spectacular examples of this. Infrastructure is the great space
shrinker, and power, wealth and status increasingly belong to those who
know how to shrink space, or know how to benefit from space being
shrunk.6
Today infrastructure plays a key role in nothing less than the creation
of what many see as a new world order where people, goods, energy,
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information and money move about with unprecedented ease. Here the
politics of distance is the elimination of distance. The name of utopia is
Zero-Friction Society. And even if we can never achieve utopian friction-
lessness, we may get close, as is currently happening with the spread of
the Internet. Modern humans clearly have a preference for independence
from space and are consistently undercutting the friction of distance
by building more and improved infrastructure for transport, including
telecommunications and energy.
Megaprojects are central to the new politics of distance because infra-
structure is increasingly being built asmegaprojects. Thus the past decade
has seen a sharp increase in the magnitude and frequency of major infra-
structure projects, supported by a mixture of national and supranational
government, private capital and development banks.
Many projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy,
environment and public support.
Performance paradox
There is a paradox here, however. At the same time as many more and
much larger infrastructure projects are being proposed and built around
the world, it is becoming clear that many such projects have strikingly
poor performance records in terms of economy, environment and public
support.7 Cost overruns and lower-than-predicted revenues frequently
place project viability at risk and redefine projects that were initially pro-
moted as effective vehicles to economic growth as possible obstacles to
such growth. The Channel tunnel, opened in 1994 at a construction cost
of £4.7 billion, is a case in point, with several near-bankruptcies caused by
construction cost overruns of 80 per cent, financing costs that are 140 per
cent higher than those forecast and revenues less than half of those pro-
jected (see Chapters 2–4). The cost overrun for Denver’s $5 billion
new international airport, opened in 1995, was close to 200 per cent
and passenger traffic in the opening year was only half of that projected.
Operating problems with Hong Kong’s new $20 billion Chek Lap Kok
airport, which opened in 1998, initially caused havoc not only to costs and
revenues at the airport; the problems spread to the Hong Kong economy
as such with negative effects on growth in gross domestic product.8 After
nine months of operations, The Economist dubbed the airport a ‘fiasco’,
said to have cost the Hong Kong economy $600 million.9 The fiasco
may have been only a start-up problem, albeit an expensive one, but it
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is the type of expense that is rarely taken into account when planning
megaprojects.
Somemay argue that in the long term cost overruns do not reallymatter
and that most monumental projects that excite the world’s imagination
had large overruns. This line of argument is too facile, however. The
physical and economic scale of today’s megaprojects is such that whole
nations may be affected in both the medium and long term by the success
or failure of just a single project. As observed by Edward Merrow in a
RAND study of megaprojects:
Such enormous sums of money ride on the success of megaprojects that com-
pany balance sheets and even government balance-of-payments accounts can be
affected for years by the outcomes . . . The success of these projects is so important
to their sponsors that firms and even governments can collapse when they fail.10
Even for a large country such as China, analysts warn that the economic
ramifications of an individual megaproject such as the Three Gorges dam
‘could likely hinder the economic viability of the country as a whole’.11
Stated in more general terms, the Oxford-based Major Projects Asso-
ciation, an organisation of contractors, consultants, banks and others
interested in megaproject development, in a recent publication speaks of
the ‘calamitous history of previous cost overruns of very large projects
in the public sector’. In another study sponsored by the Association the
conclusion is, ‘too many projects proceed that should not have done’.12
We would add to this that regarding cost overruns there is no indication
that the calamity identified by the Major Projects Association is limited
to the public sector. Private sector cost overruns are also common.
For environmental and social effects of projects, one similarly finds
that such effects often have not been taken into account during project
development, or they have been severely miscalculated.13 In Scandinavia,
promoters of the Øresund and Great Belt links at first tried to ignore or
downplay environmental issues, but were eventually forced by environ-
mental groups and public protest to accept such issues on the decision-
making agenda (seeChapter 5). InGermany, high-speed rail projects have
been criticised for not considering environmental disruption. Dams are
routinely criticised for the same thing. However, environmental problems
that are not taken into account during project preparation tend to sur-
face during construction and operations; and such problems often desta-
bilise habitats, communities and megaprojects themselves, if not dealt
with carefully. Moreover, positive regional development effects, typically
much touted by project promoters to gain political acceptance for their
projects, repeatedly turn out to be non-measurable, insignificant or even
negative (see Chapter 6).
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In consequence, the cost–benefit analyses, financial analyses and envi-
ronmental and social impact statements that are routinely carried out as
part of megaproject preparation are called into question, criticised and
denounced more often and more dramatically than analyses in any other
professional field we know. Megaproject development today is not a field
of what has been called ‘honest numbers’.14 It is a field where you will see
one group of professionals calling the work of another not only ‘biased’
and ‘seriously flawed’ but a ‘grave embarrassment’ to the profession.15
And that is when things have not yet turned unfriendly. In more an-
tagonistic situations the words used in the mud-slinging accompanying
many megaprojects are ‘deception’, ‘manipulation’ and even ‘lies’ and
‘prostitution’.16 Whether we like it or not, megaproject development is
currently a field where little can be trusted, not even – some would say
especially not – numbers produced by analysts.
Finally, project promoters often avoid and violate established practices
of good governance, transparency and participation in political and ad-
ministrative decision making, either out of ignorance or because they
see such practices as counterproductive to getting projects started. Civil
society does not have the same say in this arena of public life as it does in
others; citizens are typically kept at a substantial distance from megapro-
ject decision making. In some countries this state of affairs may be slowly
changing, but so far megaprojects often come draped in a politics of
mistrust. People fear that the political inequality in access to decision-
making processes will lead to an unequal distribution of risks, burdens
and benefits from projects.17 The general public is often sceptical or neg-
ative towards projects; citizens and interest groups orchestrate hostile
protests; and occasionally secret underground groups even encourage or
carry out downright sabotage on projects, though this is not much talked
about in public for fear of inciting others to similar guerrilla activities.18
Scandinavians, who like other people around the world have experienced
the construction of onemegaproject after another during the past decade,
have coined a term to describe the lack in megaproject decision making
of accustomed transparency and involvement of civil society: ‘democracy
deficit’. The fact that a special term has come into popular usage to de-
scribe what is going on in megaproject decision making is indicative of
the extent to which large groups in the population see the current state
of affairs as unsatisfactory.
Civil society does not have the same say in this arena of public life as it does
in others. Megaprojects often come draped in a politics of mistrust.
6 Megaprojects and Risk
Risk, democracy and power
The megaprojects paradox consists in the irony that more and more
megaprojects are built despite the poor performance record of many
projects. In this book we link the idea of megaprojects with the idea
of risk and we identify the main causes of the megaprojects paradox to
be inadequate deliberation about risk and lack of accountability in the
project decision-making process. We then proceed to propose ways out
of the paradox. We will show that in terms of risk, most appraisals of
megaprojects assume, or pretend to assume, that infrastructure policies
and projects exist in a predictable Newtonian world of cause and effect
where things go according to plan. In reality, the world of megaproject
preparation and implementation is a highly risky onewhere things happen
only with a certain probability and rarely turn out as originally intended.
Sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens have argued
that in modern society risk has increasingly become central to all aspects
of human affairs; that we live in a ‘risk society’ where deliberation about
social, economic, political and environmental issues is bound to fail if it
does not take risk into account.19 If this diagnosis is correct – and we will
argue that for megaprojects it is – then it is untenable to continue to act
as if risk does not exist or to underestimate risk in a field as costly and
consequential as megaproject development.
The Beck–Giddens approach to risk society is our point of departure
for understanding risk and its particular relevance to modern society. Yet
this approach does not take us far enough in the direction we want to go.
The problem with Beck, Giddens and related theories is that they use risk
mainly as a metaphor for mature modernity. We want to proceed beyond
the level of symbol and theory to use risk as an analytic frame and guide
for actual decision making. We will do this by developing a set of ideas
of how risk assessment and risk management may be used as vehicles for
governing risk.20 In the words of Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz,
where facts are uncertain, decision-stakes high and values in dispute, risk
assessment must be at the heart of decision making.21 A growing number
of society’s decision areas meet these criteria. Megaproject development
is one of them.
We do not believe risk can be eliminated from risk society. We believe,
however, that risk may be acknowledged much more explicitly and man-
aged a great deal better, with more accountability, than is typically the
case today. Like Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler and others, we hold that
risk assessment andmanagement should involve citizens and stakeholders
to reflect their experience and expertise, in addition to including the usual
suspects, namely government experts, administrators and politicians.22
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We here define stakeholders as key institutional actors, such as NGOs,
various levels of government, industrial interests, scientific and technical
expertise and the media. Some of these stakeholder groups will claim to
be speaking legitimately on behalf of the public good and some, but not
all of them, will be doing so. Given that such stakeholders do not always
adequately represent publics, we recognise the need, on both democratic
and pragmatic grounds, to properly involve publics in decision making.
Such involvement should take place in carefully designed deliberative
processes from the beginning and throughout large-scale projects.23 Like
Renn and Webler, we believe that one should go as far as possible with
the participatory and deliberative approach in including publics and
stakeholders and that the result will be decisions about risk that are better
informed and more democratic.
We find, nevertheless, that deliberative approaches to risk, based as
they are on communicative rationality and the goodwill of participants,
can take us only some of the way towards better decisions and will fre-
quently fail for megaprojects.24 This is so because the interests and power
relations involved in megaprojects are typically very strong, which is easy
to understand given the enormous sums of money at stake, the many
jobs, the environmental impacts, the national prestige, and so on. Com-
municative and deliberative approaches work well as ideals and evalua-
tive yardsticks for decision making, but they are quite defenceless in the
face of power.25 And power play, instead of commitment to deliberative
ideals, is often what characterises megaproject development. In addition
to deliberative processes, we also focus, therefore, on how power rela-
tions and outcomes may be influenced and balanced by reforming the
institutional arrangements that form the context of megaproject decision
making.26
Based on this approach to risk, it is an essential notion of the book that
good decision making is a question not only of better and more rational
information and communication, but also of institutional arrangements
that promote accountability, and especially accountability towards risk.
We see accountability as being a question not just about periodic elec-
tions, but also about a continuing dialogue between civil society and pol-
icymakers and about institutions holding each other accountable through
appropriate checks and balances.27 Thus we replace the conventional de-
cisionistic approach to megaproject development with a more current
institutionalistic one centred on the practices and rules that comprise
risk and accountability.28 We also hold that our approach must be based
on actual experience from concrete projects. The purpose is to ensure a
realistic understanding of the issues at hand as well as proposals that are
practically desirable and possible to implement.
8 Megaprojects and Risk
A brief overview
We build our case for a new approach to megaproject decision making in
two main steps. In the first half of the book, we identify the weaknesses
of the conventional approach to megaproject development. By so doing
we argue that a different approach is needed. Our critique of the conven-
tional approach is proactive; from the critique we tease out the problems,
namely problems that need to be embraced by an alternative approach.
In the second half of the book, we argue empirically and theoretically
how the weaknesses of the conventional approach can be overcome by
emphasising risk, institutional issues and accountability. Finally, an ex-
ample for readers with a practical bent is included in the appendix, which
shows how our approach to megaproject decision making was employed
for a specific project with which we have been involved as advisers to
the Danish government, namely the proposed Baltic Sea link connecting
Germany and Denmark across Fehmarn Belt, one of the largest cross-
national infrastructure projects in the world.
Throughout the book we illustratemajor points on the basis of in-depth
case studies of three recent megaprojects that form part of the so-called
Trans-European Transport Network sponsored by the European Union
and national governments:
(1) the Channel tunnel, also known as the ‘Chunnel’, between France
and the UK, which opened in 1994 and is the longest underwater rail
tunnel in Europe;
(2) the Great Belt link, opened in 1997–98, connecting East Denmark
with continental Europe, and including the longest suspension bridge
in Europe plus the second longest underwater rail tunnel; and finally
(3) the Øresund link between Sweden and Denmark, which opened in
2000, and which connects the rest of Scandinavia with continental
Europe.
The three case studies are supplemented by material from a large
number of other major projects, mainly from the field of transport in-
frastructure, but also from other fields such as information technology,
power plants, water projects, oil and gas extraction projects and aerospace
projects. The economics and politics of building a bridge or an airport
are surely different onmany points from those of space exploration, water
management, or providing global access to the Internet. But despite such
differences, our data show that there are also important similarities, for
instance regarding cost overrun and financial risk, where we find a re-
markably similar pattern across different project types. We argue that the
measures of accountability that are necessary for detecting and curbing
systematic cost underestimation, benefit overestimation and other risks
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are quite similar across projects. Thus, even though the main focus of the
book is the development of mega transport infrastructure projects, the
approach developed is relevant for other types of megaproject as well.
Our case studies and other data cover both public and private sector
projects. We argue that for megaprojects there is no simple formula for
the government–business divide. Megaprojects are so complicated that
by nature they are essentially hybrid. This is the case even for projects
that are considered fully private, for instance the Channel tunnel, because
the sheer complexity and potential impacts of a megaproject dictate deep
public-sector involvement for many issues, for instance regarding safety
and environment. Thus public–private collaboration is crucial, even for
private-sector projects. The question is not whether such collaboration
should take place but how. In Chapters 9 and 10 we address this question
and redraw the borderlines of public and private involvement inmegapro-
ject development with a view to improving governance of risk.
By linking the idea of megaprojects with the idea of risk we hope to
broaden the scope of the risk literature and to attract attention to this
topic. As far as we are aware, no other study does this today. In writing
the book, we have aimed at an interdisciplinary audience of students and
scholars in the social and decision-making scienceswith an interest in risk,
public policy and planning, ranging from sociology and social policy to
political science and public policy to public administration, management
and planning. Policy makers, administrators and planners are also an im-
portant target group for the book, as are consultants, auditors and other
practitioners working with megaproject development. We maintain that
governments and developers who continue to ignore the type of knowl-
edge and proposals presented here do so at their own peril. Megaprojects
are increasingly becoming highly public and intensely politicised ven-
tures drawing substantial international attention with much potential for
generating negative publicity.
The Three Gorges dam mentioned above is a case in point. So is the
650 km Myanmar–Thailand natural gas pipeline and maintenance road,
built through pristine natural forests and habitats. Lonely Planet, the
world’s leading travel guidebook publisher, decided to print, up front in
its best-selling Thailand guide, a highly visible protest against the pipeline
which called the actions of both the Thai government and named trans-
national companies, such as American Unocal and French Total, a
‘scam’, ‘shameful’ and a ‘fait accompli’.29 Lonely Planet encourages the
reader to join the protests against the project and lists – thorough as
always – three addresses and telephone and fax numbers where that is
possible. This is hardly how the Tourist Authority of Thailand would
have preferred to present the country to its visitors, nor is it the type of
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publicity that transnational corporations opt for, if they have a choice.
Our point is they do: there is another way to deal with megaprojects and
this book explains what this is.
Finally, though we did not write the book with lay readers primarily
in mind, we hope that individuals, communities, activists, media and the
general public interested in and affected by megaproject development
will find useful insights in the book, for instance regarding the deceptions
and power games they are likely to encounter if they get involved with
megaprojects. Understanding the anatomy of megaprojects is necessary
to be an effective player in project development. And, as mentioned,
we see stronger involvement by civil society and stakeholder groups in
megaproject decisionmaking as a prerequisite for decisions that are better
informed and more democratic.
Theorists of risk society and democracy have recently begun to con-
template the type of practical policy and planning needed for dealing with
risk in real-life public deliberation and decision making. ‘In risk society’,
one study concludes, ‘public policy requires long-term planning for
uncertainty, within a clear framework of principles and evidence to sup-
port devolved and flexible decision making. This, in turn, requires the
involvement of informed and active citizens, enjoying a mature, adult-
to-adult relationship with experts and with politicians. A high-trust
democracy: the only way to face a risky future.’30 In order for this ap-
proach to work, the trust in ‘high-trust democracy’ must be based on, not
feet-in-the-air idealism about the merits of democracy, but hard-nosed
considerations about risk and democratic accountability. Life will never
be risk free, we are happy to report. But risk can be faced in ways much
more intelligent than those currently seen. We offer this book as an at-
tempt at fleshing out in practice the type of decision making and democ-
racy called for by theorists of risk and democracy for a specific domain
of increasing social, economic and political importance, namely that of
megaproject development.
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